The centralremarks of the Tractatus are without substantial content or consequence, remarks at theb oundaries of sense that dissolvei nto truth.W hile theys ay nothing,t heye ncapsulatel ogicalf eatures of languagea nd thew orld.U nasserted, they expresst houghts, thet ruth of which Wittgensteint akest ob eu nassailablea nd definitive, while asserted,they are out-and-out nonsense.Whati sm anifest in linguistic practice is no more sayable -andn ol esss ignificant -thanw hati s manifest in logical truths,mathematicalequationsand theprinciplesof mechanics.
Understandingthe Tractatus
Ludwig Wittgenstein seems to espouse philosophical opinions and defend ad istinctive philosophicalp oint of viewi nt he Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP 1955 (TLP /1961 1 .T here is no shaking the impression thath ei sf ully engaged in thep hilosophicale nterprise, and it doesh im ad isservice to interpret hima sd ismissing philosophy root and branch. Besides criticising traditional philosophy and pioneering an ew approach to philosophical problems, he promotes what looksf or allt he world like philosophicali deas. This is how the Tractatus was read at the time by Bertrand Russell, Frank Ramsey andthe members of the Vienna Circle,n ot least Rudolf Carnapa nd Moritz Schlick,a nd how it is stillw idely read. It cannot be by chancet hat Wittgenstein refers to "the thoughts whicha re expressedi n[ the book]-or similar thoughts" and avers that "in it thoughts are expressed",i ndeed writes: " [T] he truth of the thoughts communicated [mitgeteilten] here seems to me unassailablea nd definitive [ unantastbar und definitiv] " (TLP 1955 : 27-29/TLP 1961 , with "set forth" for "mitgeteilten"). Yet in 6.54, thep enultimate remark of theb ook, Wittgensteinf amously andn otoriously says: "My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finallyr ecognizes them as senseless [ unsinnig] " (TLP1 955; TLP 1961 has "nonsensical" for "unsinnig"). Can this apparentc ontradictionb e removed and if so,how? 2 Therea re two markedlyd ifferent sortso fs entence in the Tractatus.W ittgensteinh as manyc omments on thev iewso f individualp hilosophers and the history and character of philosophy.Thus he says: " [T] hewhole of philosophyisfull of [the most fundamental confusions]" (3.324), "The logical symbolism of Fregea nd Russell[ does] note xclude alle rrors" (3.325), and "The Darwiniant heoryh as no moret od ow ith philosophy than any otherhypothesis of natural science" (4.1122). (Also compare 3.143, 3.318, 3 .325, 4.003, 4 .113, 5.132, 5 .525a nd 5.5422.) But there are also many philosophical-soundingr emarks in the Tractatus comparablet othe remarkso fg reat philosophers of thep ast. Thus Wittgenstein says: "Thew orld is everythingt hat is thec ase.T he world is the totality of facts, notofthings" (1-1.1), "Anamemeans an object. Theo bject is its meaning" (3.203), and "Logici s. .. a reflectiono ft he world. Logici st ranscendental" (6.13). Since remarkso ft he first sort, stripped of hyperbole, are implausibly regarded either as indisputablyt rueo ra sp lainly nonsensical (ora s fundamental to the Tractatus), Wittgensteini sm ost charitably 2 Except where explicitly noted, Icite TLP 1955, the translationp reparedbyC.K. Ogden and F. Ramsey,t his havingb een vetted by Wittgensteinh imself. Id on ot attemptt o coverall that hasbeensaidabout Wittgenstein'scharacterisations of his own remarks, just touch brieflyonsome of theleading ways theyhavebeenunderstood. My main object is to resuscitate and developal ine of interpretation advanced in my (2003) .I attempt to clarify,refinea nd deepen whatIsaid there, not leastregardingW ittgenstein'sconception of "showing" andits role in the Tractatus.
regarded as referring to thes econd sort of remark in hisP reface and 6.54,and thequestionbecomes howtheseremarks, manifestly centraltohis thinking,are to be understood.
When the spotlight is turned on what seem to be straight-out philosophicalr emarks in theb ook, it is temptingt ot hink ac hoice has to be made between regarding them as unassailably and definitively true and regarding them as nonsensical. It seems,ashas beenn oted, "quite unacceptable ...t hato ne andt he same series of pronouncementss hould be both devoid of sense andu nassailably true",a nd it is scarcely possible that "Wittgensteinc ould ... have it both ways" (Ayer1 985: 20,3 0). Moreover, given thec hoice, the more acceptable -certainly the usual -response is that Wittgensteini sb etter regardeda st hinkingt he "contents[ of the Tractatus]true" (30).Suchaninterpretation, however,laboursunder the difficulty thatW ittgenstein does nota ppeart ob espeakingo ut of turn in 6.54, never mindd abbling in ironyo rs peakingt onguein-cheek. Rather he seems to be sayingw hat he believes and believing what he says. Furthermore his description of hiso wn sentencesa t6 .54 does notf eell ikea no ptionale xtra, to be taken with apinchofsalt.Tothe contrary,there is acase to be made for the view that "ideast hat Wittgenstein presents [att he end of the Tractatus]h avea ll been carefully built up to, ande merge, as the naturalc onsequence of the main discussion of the book" (White 2006:125) . While it may turn outthat 6.54 has to be ignored, this is surelyaremedy of last resort.
Perhaps the tidiest solution, were it available,w ouldb et or ead Wittgensteina sr eferring at the beginning andt he endo ft he Tractatus to different remarks. There wouldb en oc ontradiction were he thinking in the Prefaceo fh is treatment of language and logic andt hinkinga t6 .54o fh is treatment of the world, valuea nd philosophy (compare Child 2011 :7 2, also Black 1964 . The chief snagw itht his is that it is hard to discern anyd ifference in tone, evenl ogical status,b etween the two sortso fr emarks. While Wittgenstein applaudss ome of what philosophers saya bout logica nd languagea nd deplores mosto fw hat theys ay about the world and value, therei sn oi ndication in thet extt hat he regarded hiso wn remarks about the twos ets of topicsd ifferently. He does not split thed ifferencea nd mark "Thew orld is everything that is the case" off from "An ame meansa no bject" and "Logic is transcendental".Indeedwhat he says about theworld andstatesof affairsatthe beginning of the Tractatus shadesinto his discussion of picturesa nd propositional signs (andh is discussion of logic and language), which in turn shades into his remarksa tt he end of the book abouthappiness, life anddeath.
Another commonly-defendedw ay of negotiating the problem of interpretingW ittgenstein's remarkst akesh im to be meaning to convey unassailable and definitive truths despite -even in virtue of -the nonsensicalityo fh is sentences (compareA nscombe 1959: 162, Malcolm1 967: 331, and Hacker 2001: 139-143 [osition] s, but only shown (gezeigt)" to be fundamental,i ndeeds peaks of it as "the cardinalp roblemo f philosophy" (McGuinness 2008:9 8) .S uch an interpretationi s, however, also hard to accept. It presumes Wittgenstein is committed to the dubious idea thatnonsense can communicate and takes his own (nonsensical)s entences to carry important information about the world,l anguage,l ogica nd much else besides.I ndeed attributing such av iewt oh im is as unjust as it is uncharitable, there beingn othing in the Tractatus to suggest that he disagrees with whath ei sr eported to have said much later: "Most of us thinkthere is nonsense that makessenseand nonsense which doesn ot. ...B ut these aren onsensei nt he same sense, the only difference being in the jingle of thewords" (AWL: 64).
Amore radical proposal, one stoutly defended in some quarters, is that Wittgensteinb ites the bullet andr egards his remarks as gibberish pure and simple (compare Diamond 1991 and the essays in Crarya nd Read 2000) . On this view it is not insignificant that Wittgenstein deprecatedc alling his book "Philosophical Logic" "[u]nless onesays ...the whole book is nonsense" (CCO:20, dated 23 April1 922). Bute vena cceptingt hath ei sa greeing, rathert han disputing, that theb ooki tselfi sn onsense( and allowing that what seems to make sense is disguisedn onsense),i ti sd ifficult to disregard or diluteh is observation in theP reface about the unassailable and definitivet ruth of hist houghts. On the faceo fi t, Wittgensteini sa sw edded to regarding his remarksa st ruea st o regarding them as nonsensical, andh es eems to take himself, no two ways about it, to be expressing thoughts about logic, language and the world.A lsow ereh ep almingo ff nonsense as sense, how couldh eclaim anything non-sayable is showable?O ncee verything goes,t here seems to be no preservingt he distinction between showing and saying,the very thingi nthe Tractatus that is,arguably, "strikingly original, for its period" (Mounce 2001: 187 ;f or further criticism seeWhite2006: 125-130,and Hacker2000).
If none of these interpretations is tenable, the only remaining possibility is thatW ittgenstein reckoned his remarks in the Preface and at 6.54 to be fully compatible (and hadn ot ruck witht he notion of significant nonsense). Such ar eading of thet exth as the notable advantage that Wittgenstein does not appeart oh ave believed he was skatingonthin ice or to have been, consciously or unconsciously,p ulling af ast one.I tn ot only recognisest hat Wittgensteinp roclaimsi nn ou ncertain terms that his thoughts are unassailablya nd definitively true andh is propositions nonsensical, it also allows for thef actt hat he set great, if noto verwhelming, store on thes ay/show distinction. Moreover it explains how he was able to take in strideR ussell's observationi nh is Introduction to the Tractatus that "Mr Wittgensteinm anages to say ag ood deal about what cannot be said" (TLP 1955 : 22/TLP 1961 , and it accountsf or his apparent indifference to theo bjection when Russell reportedly pressed it in 1929 (Wood 1957:1 56) . While it is by no means cleart hat the remarksi nt he Preface and 6.54 can be reconciled, only an interpretationt hatt akes hima sh avingi tb oth ways cans ave himf rom thec harge of failing to see -or being unable to admit -thathehad set his sights too high.
Wittgenstein'sthoughtsastautologies
Wittgensteinw ouldh ave some explaining to do were he equating "thought" and "proposition" andt aking thema st heyo ccur in the Preface and 6.54 to mean the same. Butt hisi sn ot howh e understands them. His primarya im wast oc onvey hist hinkinga s effectively and as vividlyashecould,and it is more than likely that he is using the twowords in two ways. He states that "thevalue" of the book is "greater ... [t] he more thenailhas beenhit on thehead" (TLP 1955 :2 9, TLP 1961 , andt he possibility that he contradictsh imself so blatantlyi sh ardt oc redit. He was nota careless thinker butn either was he especially concerned with technicaln iceties, and it is good policyt or eservej udgement regarding his useoftricky words like "thought" and "proposition" priort oacareful examinationo ft he contexti nw hich they occur. As hasb eenn oted, Wittgenstein "thought intuitively,n ot discursively" (McGuinness 2002: 135) , andw hat he says in the Preface and6.54 -in fact, Iwould say, the whole book -has to be read as recording the consideredr eflections of an inspirational thinker ratherthan the hypotheses of aphilosopher concernedwith spelling out every detail andpre-empting every possible objection.
WhenW ittgensteins peakso fh is unassailably and definitively true thoughts -"Theworld is everythingthat is the case", "Aname means an object", "Logic is transcendental" andthe rest -he is not using "thought" in the senses pecified in theb odyo ft he Tractatus. No suchr emark is "[a] logical pictureo ft he facts" (3), leta lone parto f" ap icture of the world" (3.01). "The worldi se verything thati sthe case",tos ay nothingof"An ame meansa nobject" and "Logic is transcendental",d oes not logically picture af acti n Wittgenstein's (ora ny ordinary) sense of "logic", "picture" or "fact".Morestrikingly still, remarks of this sort fail to possess what he takest ob et he crucialc haracteristic of pictures, thato fb eing both capable of being true and capable of being false. Thoughts thata re unassailably and definitively true cannotb ea nything but true,and thoughts that cannot be anything but true arenot pictures (or thoughts officially understood). What Wittgensteini sc laiming in his Preface must be that he is expressing thoughtsinthe bookhisthoughts about thoughts at 3and 3.01 included -in an anodyne senseof"thought",i.e.heissayingwhathethinks.
It is no surprise that Wittgenstein should describe himselfa s expressing thoughts thata re unassailablya nd definitively true. He recognises thath em ay have erred -he says the trutho fh is thoughts "seems" to him unassailable and definitive (TLP 1955: 29;  TLP 1961: 5) -andh ed oes not hesitatei nl ater work to criticise, supplement andcorrect whathesaysinthe Tractatus.Atthe time of writing,h owever, he was convinced thati nsofar as his remarks are truetheyare necessarilytrue. Forhim "The world is everythingthat is the case", "An ame means an object" and "Logic is transcendental" are true comew hat may.I ti s, he thinks, beyond belief thatt he world could comprisem ore or less than what is the case,t hat names might not mean objects (in hiss pecial sense of theset erms),a nd logic is merely ar epositoryo fm undane knowledge. Forh im " [t] he objecto fp hilosophy is thel ogical clarification of thoughts" (4.112), and he is best read as taking his thoughts to be clarifications, i.e. what he will later call grammatical propositions (compare PI §251). While it may not be self-evident that what he saysi sc larificatory, uninfluenced by howt hings happen to be,hebelievedthis becomesclear when hisremarks are thoughtt hrough. Forh im " [e] verys entence in the Tractatus should be seen as the heading of ac hapter, needing further exposition" (Drury1 984: 159)a nd further exposition showst heir truth to be unantastbar und definitiv.
Wittgensteinb elieved it ag rosse rrort ot reat philosophy as rooted in science,commonsense or thewisdom of theages, andhe neverwavered in regardingt he endeavour as essentially logicala nd devoid of information properly so-called, hiso wn remarks included. Since philosophical observations arec ategorically different from scientific observations (4.111),t he insights expressed in the Tractatus are neither supported norundermined by scientific theory,a ctualo rp ossible.I nh is view " [t] here is no picture which is ap riori true" (2.225), ande veryg enuine ap riori thoughti sn on-empiricala nd non-picturing. In contrastt o philosophersw ho take themselves to be expressing substantial a priori thoughts, Wittgenstein takes his own (apriori)t houghts to be empty (andd isparages knowledge purportedly securedb ypure reason, rational intuition or the grasping of essences). It is notf or nothingt hat immediatelya fter describing thet ruth of his thoughts as unassailableand definitive, Wittgensteinstatesthat "the valueof [the Tractatus]s econdlyc onsistsi nt he fact thati ts howsh ow little has been done when these problems have been solved".( Notice thath ed oesn ot say that nothingh as been achievedw hen the problems -it is unclear whether he means all philosophical problems or justt he ones discussed in the Tatsache] ' and Iconjecture that to be the case and to be afact aret he same. Thew orld is everything that is the case andt he worldi st he totalityo ff acts" (Frege 2011 (Frege :5 1-55/2003 . Thisi sb othr ight andw rong. On the interpretationIampromoting, what Fregevolunteers as criticism is accurated escription. Wittgensteinr egards the allegeds hortcoming as avirtuesince he takes the remarks Fregementions to be without substance, "the case" and "af act" being,a sF rege observes, "the same".I ndeed Is ee Wittgenstein as believing it indisputable that "everyf act[ is]t he case",i ndisputable that "thatw hichi st he case [is]afact",a nd indisputablet hat "LetAbe af act" and "Let Ab e the case" amounttothe samething.Heisnot missing atrick when he notest hesei dentifications bute xpressing thoughts he means to express, "Theworld is everythingthat is the case" (1), "What is the case [is] the fact" (2)and his other(philosophical)remarks beingin his view apriori insights.
To put it another way, Ia ms uggesting that in theP reface Wittgensteini st hinking of ther emarks in theb ooka st autologies in the traditionalsenseofempty truisms.While he characterises the notion of atautologyn arrowly as ap roposition [Sätze] "true forall the truth-possibilities of the elementary propositions [Elementarsätze]" (4.46), he works with an otion that covers much more (for thet wo notions of tautology see Dreben andF loyd 1991).T hus, to mention ap articularly striking example, he takes "propositions" aboutt he internalr elationships amongc olours, tones andt he liket ob et autologousi nt he pre-Tractarian broad sense (4.123). To his way of thinking,h is own remarks,l ike tautologiesi nt he official Tractarian sense, "sayn othing" and are "without sense" (4.461). He regards "The worldi se verythingt hat is the case" as tautologous sinceinthe present context "theworld" is synonymous to "everythingt hat is the case",r egards "An ame means an object" as tautologous since "[t]he object it names is its meaning",a nd regards "Logici st ranscendental" as tautologous since it is "not at heory butareflection [Spiegelbild] o ft he world" (6.13). Presumably he is notthinkingofsuch remarks as tautologies in thes ense of 4.46.B ut he treats them as tautologies in the broader traditionalsense -at leastsoIam arguing.
LaterW ittgensteinw illd isparage the philosopher's tendency to regardthe concepts of world,name, thoughtand the likeas"superconcepts" (compare PI §97).B ut in 1918, when compiling the Tractatus,h er egarded his own remarks as trueb yc ourtesyr ather thanb yr ight,i .e.b yb eing "limiting caseso ft he combinations of symbols" (4.466) rather than" by being pictures of ther eality" (4.06). It is nott hat his remarks "belong to roughly the same category [as tautologies]" (Mounce 1981: 102) b ut that theya re logically on allfours with "Redisacolour" and "Nothingoccurs in two different placesa tt he samet ime".O ncea gain it is immaterial thatt he tautological character of hisr emarks is noti mmediately discernible,t he tautologicalc haracter of many necessary truths, grammaticalr emarks andt autologies of elementaryl ogic being equallyrecondite.Nor is it astrikeagainstreading Wittgenstein as I do that his thoughts are too imprecisely expressed to count as "definitional" (Morris2 008: 22). However unclear the remarks of the Tractatus,t heya re plausibly regardeda sp inning down,a tl east partly, themeaningsofthe terms involved.
While Wittgensteind oes not explicitly distinguish between two senses of "tautology" in the Tractatus,s till less refers to his own remarksa st autologous, he uses thew ord "tautology" in the traditional,b road sensei ne arlier andl ater writings. Thus in a remark drafted on 17 June1 915 he says: "[T]he complexity of spatial objectsi salogical complexity, fort os ay that onet hing is part of anotherisalways atautology" (NB 1979: 62) . Andin1929, on returning to philosophy, he observest hat claims about shades of colour havingm ore thano ne degreeo fb rightness "do not expressa ne xperience but arei ns omes ense tautologies" (RLF 1993: 32) ands ays: "One mayb et empted to sayw hatIa m wonderinga t[ when Ia mw ondering at the skyb eing there] is a tautology" (LE1 993: 42). Moreoverw henc ompiling the Tractatus, he wouldh aveb een aware of how thew ord "tautology" was used at the time, e.g. thatFrege writes: "[T]he number whichbelongsto the conceptFis identicalw itht he number which belongs to the concept Gifthe concept Fisequaltothe concept G... sounds, of course, like atautology" (1950: §73) andRussell writes: "Thelaw of tautology states that no changeismadewhenaclass of proposition is addedt oo rm ultipliedb yi tself" (1937:2 3).A lsoi ti sw orth noting that in 1925 Ramsey judgedt he axiom of choice to be "the most evident tautology" (1990: 221).
Logic, mathematicsand mathematicalphysics
Therei si na ny event ac lose resemblance between how Wittgensteinv iews hiso wn philosophical thoughts andh ow he treats logic in the Tractatus.What he says about logic transfers with minorm odifications and qualificationst oh is own remarks,t hese being reminiscent of nothings om uch as what he calls "logical propositions" (forh is unfussy useo f" proposition" in connection with logic, see Fogelin 1987: 45-47) . In his viewt he likes of "The world is everythingt hat is the case" arel ogically on the same footing as tautologies narrowly construed and their "correct explanation",nolessthan the correctexplanation of "If p, then p", "must give themapeculiar position among all propositions" (6.112).H ew as of the opinion that "philosophicalp ropositions", like "propositions of logic", "canbenomoreempirically confirmed than theyc an be empiricallyr efuted" (6.1222), are "of equal rank" (6.127) andc onstitute( in part) whath ev ariously calls "logical scaffolding" and "the scaffolding of the world" (3.42,4 .023). It is notj ust that a "great many" of the major remarks of the Tractatus "can be salvaged" by noting that theya re "formal statements" (Black 1964: 381) . It is that theya ll can be so "rescue[d]", "the most strikingones" included (382).
In thep resentc ontext it is especiallyh elpful to consider what Wittgenstein says about "logicalp ropositions" at 6.124, the most important passage on "logical scaffolding".O naq uick first look, this passage seems to pose adifficulty for theideathat the thoughts expressed in the Tractatus arewithoutsubstance.The trouble is that far from treatinglogical propositions -and by extension,asIsee it, his own propositions -as devoido fc ontent, Wittgensteins ays: "The logicalp ropositions describet he scaffolding of thew orld". Once more,h owever, it would be wrong to jumpt oc onclusions. Wittgenstein's use of the word "describe [beschreiben]" hast ob e balanced against what he says elsewhere, includingh is observation at 6.11 that "[t]hepropositions of logic ... say nothing".And, more significantlys till, at 6.124 itselfh eb acktracks anda dds: "or rather theyp resent it [oder vielmehr, sie stellene sd ar]".W hichi st os ay "describe" is misleadinga nd logical propositions arem ore accuratelys pokeno fa ss howing or displaying the scaffolding. (It alsoh elps my causei f" darstellen" is rendered as "to be" (Schulte forthcoming), my contention being that Wittgenstein's thoughts belong to, rather thandescribe, "the scaffolding".)
HowW ittgenstein thinks of his own remarks is, Ia m persuaded,e quallyc omparable to how he thinks of "the propositions of mathematics" in the6 .2s, even howh et hinkso f mathematical equations. He was committed to the view that his thoughts, like "everyp roposition of mathematics", "must be selfevident [sich von selbst verstehen muß]" (6.2341; TLP1 961 has "must go without saying"). For him "Thew orld is everythingt hati st he case" cann om oreb ed ismisseda sg ibberish than am athematical proposition/equation. Disparaging suchp hilosophicalr emarks because they do notc ount as genuinep ropositions is as biga mistake as disparaging the likeso f" 2+2= 4 "because theya re "pseudo-propositions [Scheinsätze]" (6.2). Justa sW ittgenstein regards mathematics as as ymbolism, so -Ia ms uggesting -his own "philosophicalp ropositions" function as as ymbolism, and "[j]ust as with thes ystem of numbers onem ust be able to write down any arbitraryn umber" (6.341), so with the system of thoughtsa dumbrated in the Tractatus onem ust be able to write down any arbitrary sentence. Thet autologies of Wittgenstein's system of thoughts constitute, like tautologiesn arrowly construed, "part of the symbolism, in the same way that '0' is part of the symbolism of Arithmetic" (4.4611).
Possiblym ore telling,h owever, is that the centralr emarkso f the Tractatus arec omparable to the propositions of mathematical physics (asW ittgensteinc onstruest hem). When discussing NewtonianM echanics, Wittgenstein uses thew ord "proposition" to covern ecessarilyt rue Sätze,a nd it is notf orcing the issuet o regardhim as believing that hisown remarks have the same logical status as "them echanicala xioms" (6.341). He writes: "Newtonian mechanics ... bringst he description of the universe to au nified form",a nd the centralr emarks of the Tractatus can, Iv enture to suggest, be said to do the same at amore general and abstractlevel. Philosophy as Wittgensteinu nderstands it can be summarised, not too misleadingly,a sh es ummarisesN ewtonianM echanics, namely as "an attempt to constructa ccording to as ingle plan all true propositions which we needf or thed escription of thew orld" (6.343). Forh im philosophy also delineatesa" purely geometrical" network of concepts, "all [the] properties[of which]can be givena priori" (6.35). He holds that "thel aw of causation, thel aw of continuity in nature,the law of least expenditure in nature, etc. etc., ... are ap riori intuitions of possible forms of the propositions of science" (6.34), andIa ma dding that he is recording ap riori intuitions about thep ossible forms of propositions of anys ort.I n both areas, "theapriori certain [Gewisse]p roves to be something purely logical" (6.3211).
Tautologies show the formalpropertiesoflanguage andthe world
Recognising the kinship of Wittgenstein's thoughts to the propositions of logic,m athematics andm echanics has thef urther advantage of clearing away much of the fogs urrounding his observations about saying and showing. Insofar as tautologies, equations and the "logical apparatus [of] physical laws" (6.3431) showt he (unsayable) "logic of the world" (6.22), his ownm ore generalremarks showintheir own way "thelogical form of reality" (4.121) andcorrelatively "the inexpressible", "das Mystische" (6.522). For the purposeo fd elineating featureso fl anguagea nd thew orld, tautologies broadlyu nderstood are as good as logical propositions, mathematical equations and mechanical axioms,a nd it is as trueof Wittgenstein's own thoughts, as of "thepropositions of logic",that their being "tautologies shows the formal-logical-properties of language, of the world" (6.12). Otherwise put, Ia mo pposing the suggestiont hat there is ad istinction "in thet heory of the Tractatus between logicalt ruths[ which are' tautologies']a nd the thingst hat are 'shewn'" (Anscombe 1959 :1 63). Wittgenstein thinks formal/logicalpropertiesmanifest themselves in his "propositions" as well as in other logical/necessary/apriori "propositions".
But howd or emarks like "The worldi st he totalityo ff acts" showl ogicalp roperties of languagea nd the world? It is unhelpful to note thatW ittgensteinw rites: "'fa' shows [zeigt]t hat in itss ense the object a occurs [ and] twop ropositions 'fa' and 'ga' [show] that they areb oth about the same object" (4.1211).N or is there much to be gleaned fromh is observation in "Notes Dictated to G.E. Moore" that "[e]ven if there were propositions of [the] form 'Misa thing' they wouldb es uperfluous (tautologous) because whatt his tries to sayi ss omething which is already seen when you see 'M'" (AM:1 10). More useful, though still somewhat obscure, is what Wittgensteinsaysat6.36: "If therewerealaw of causality, it might run: 'There arel awso fn ature'.B ut that can clearly not be said:i t showsi tself [es zeigt sich]".W hat he means, It akei t, is that conformitytothe lawofcausalityshows itselfinscientificpractice, i.e. in theu se of mechanics and other formso fs cientific representation. This prompts the thoughtt hat he takes "formallogical-propertieso fl anguage,o ft he world" to be manifest in linguistic practice, theessentialfeaturesofwhichare summed up in the unassailably anddefinitively true thoughts of the Tractatus.
In the courseo fd iscussing "logical propositions",W ittgenstein writes: "It is clearthat it must show [anzeigen muß]something about thew orld thatc ertain combinations of symbols ...a re tautologies [Tautologiensind]" (6.124),a nd Ia mc onjecturing that he believedi t must show something aboutt he world that the combinations of symbols in the Tractatus aretautologies.Iread him as holdingthatit comes outi nh ow we talk aboutt he world that the world is everything that is the case, thati tc omes out in how thoughts are expressedt hat an ame means an object( compare3 .2)a nd that it comeso ut in thei mpossibility of languager epresentingw hat is mirrored in language thatl ogic is transcendental( 4.121).M y suggestion is that allt he truths of the Tractatus,n ot just the "metaphysical truths" of the work, "show themselves precisely in the use of language" (Mounce2 001: 188). Wittgensteinb elieved that the truthsatthe beginning of the bookare "metaphysical" in name only and that none of his "propositions" are "intended to indicate what eludes them edium of language butt od irect oura ttentiont o what showsi tself in thatm edium" (ibid.). (Also see Griffin 1964: Chapter3,"The doctrineofshowing".) At the risk of belabouring the obvious, Iw ould mention that I taket he remarksi nt he 6.3s about mathematical physics to be unusually helpful forunderstandingthe significance of the Tractatus. It is not justthat the discussion of NewtonianMechanics at 6.341-6.343 sheds lighto nh ow Wittgenstein couldh avet aken hiso wn thoughts to be unassailably andd efinitely true, treated his own propositions as nonsensicala nd justifiably availed himselfo ft he distinction between sayingand showing. It also becomes clear how Wittgenstein's thoughts can be taken -and were apparently taken by thea uthoro ft he Tractatus himself -to be of thee ssence. Nobody, least of allW ittgenstein, considers Newtonian Mechanics to be trivial, and theremarks of the Tractatus,thoughdoubtless less momentous, arel ikewisen on-trivial. Wittgenstein does not reckon the propositions of mathematicalp hysics importantb ecause, while nonsensical, theye ncapsulatet ruth or somehowm anaget ot each useful lessons, so why interpret hima st hinking of his own propositionst his way? Newtonian Mechanics is important since it "providest he bricks for building thee difice of science" (6.341), and Wittgenstein's thoughts ares imilarlyi mportant since they provide the bricks forbuilding any sort of edifice.
Sätze as elucidations
An account of Wittgenstein's remarkso ft he sortIa ma dvancing, thecentral pillar of which is that they are -andweremeant -to be understood as tautologous, has several obvious advantages. Once the tautological character of his thoughts is noticed, hisclaim to be expressing unassailable and definitivet ruths posesn os pecial problem. Noristhere any need to distinguish between hisopening remarksa bout thew orld and stateso fa ffairs from the remarks about language and logic that follow. Norisitnecessary to treat his concluding remarksa bout the happy person and the meaning of lifea so ut-of-place afterthoughts. Moreover thes ay/show distinctioni sa ccordedt he weight Wittgenstein places on it, and showing is neitherd isparaged nort reated as ad ispensable extra. It only remains to consider the other half of the equation,t he half about oure ventuallyr ecognisingt hat thepropositions of the book are nonsensical. While tautologies cannot be said straight-outtobe nonsensical (andg obbledygookc annot reasonably be regardeda s showing what cannot be said),i ti su nclear how treating Wittgenstein's Sätze as tautologies canb es quared with takingh is declaration at 6.54 at facev alue.S till it is not outlandisht or egard whathesaysin6.54aswell-taken, even as inescapable.
6.54 is nota ss traightforward as oftens upposed.W ittgenstein firstw rites: "MeineS ätze erläutern dadurch,d ass sied er,w elcher mich versteht,amEnde als unsinnig erkennt,wenn er durschsieaufi hnen-über sieh inausgesteigen ist" (TLP 1955 : "My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally recognizes them as senseless, when he has climbed out through them, on them, over them" /TLP 1961: "My propositions serve as elucidationsinthe following way: anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used them-as steps-to climb up beyond them".) Nexthesays(within parentheses): "He [i.e. the person who understandshim] must so to speakt hrow away the ladder, after he has climbed up on it".A nd he adds (on as eparate line): "He [i.e. thes amep erson]m ust surmount these propositions;t henh ew ills ee thew orld rightly". Three questions immediately come to mind: What exactly does Wittgensteinm ean by "MeineS ätze" and how do theye lucidate? Why should ourc oming to recognise thema su nsinnig make any difference?A nd howi st he metaphoro fc limbingt he ladder to be understood and whyd oesc limbingWittgenstein's laddere nable us to see theworld rightly?
When Wittgensteins peaks of his Sätzea t6 .54, he cannotb e working with the conception of "proposition" specified in the body of the book. No doubt,his primaryaim,hereasalways, is to hitthe nail on theh ead, andt he relevant notion of proposition must be something like "intelligible sequenceo fw ords".N one of them ain remarks of the Tractatus is ap roposition in theo fficial sense,n one being a "propositional sign in itsp rojective relationt ot he world" (3.12) or "apicture of reality" (4.021). "The world is everythingthat is the case" canb es aidt ob e" expressed perceptively through the senses" (3.1), buti ti sh ardly a "sensibly perceptible sign (sound or written sign,etc.) of the propositionasaprojectionofthe possible state of affairs" (3.11). To Wittgenstein's way of thinking,t here is no such thing as an onsensical proposition in theT ractarians ense, thereb eing no sucht hing as ap icture that does notp icture correctly or incorrectly. Forh im an onsensical proposition/picture is ac ontradiction in terms,p icturing beingamattero ft hinking whati sp ossible andt here being no thinkingt he illogical (3.02-3.03). (Trickp ictures purportingt op ortrayt he impossible are obviously not counterexamples.)
When "meine Sätze" is understood as referring to Wittgenstein's remarks ordinarily understood, the question abouth ow they elucidatev irtually answersi tself.T heya re "elucidatory" since they show "formal-logical-propertieso fl anguage, of thew orld". Wittgensteini sunderlining that the key remarkso fthe Tractatus lay bare how we speak andthinkratherthanconveyinformation about the world, language, logic and the rest. This is not anew thought. It echoes the point expressed in 4.112 aboutp hilosophical works consisting "essentiallyo fe lucidations" and philosophy being "an activity", "not at heory".N or is it fortuitous that 6.54 follows 6.53 on "[t]he right method in philosophy",ap assage in which Wittgensteinu rges philosophers "[t]o sayn othinge xcept whatc an be said, i.e. the propositions of naturals cience, i.e. somethingt hat hasnothing to do with philosophy".Instating this, Wittgensteini s not, as regularlyassumed, conceding that there is somethingwrong with his discussion (e.g.K uusela2 011:6 01). He is recognising that there is aw orld of difference between the elucidatory/showable and the sayable/picturable.
In stressing Wittgenstein's observation about the elucidatory function of his Sätze,Iam not cutting myself off from providing an explanation of their nonsensicality. Tautologies must,t ot he extent thatt hey elucidate, make some sort of sense. But the possibility of their serving as elucidations does nots tand andf all with their making sense( or their being recognised "finally" as unsinnig). The crucialp oint is that Wittgensteinc ouples elucidation and nonsensicalitya nd hast ob er egarded as having believed his remarksare simultaneously elucidatory and nonsensical. On pain of interpretingh im as contradicting himself and understanding his Sätze the same waya t6 .54a si nt he Preface,h eh as to be understood as taking the setting fortho ft houghts to be different from the setting down of propositions,i .e.h em ust have reckoned it possible to read his remarks either as unassailably anddefinitively truet houghts or as nonsensical propositions. While he certainly refers to thesame(written) sentences as thoughts andpropositions, he cannot have takenh is remarks-construed-as-thoughts to be propositions or taken hisr emarks-construed-as-propositions to be thoughts.
The simplest andm ost charitablee xplanation of 6.54,Iam arguing, is that Wittgensteini sn oting that whoeverg rasps his thinking will eventually seeh ei sn ot describing, stating facts, conveying information.T he gist of the passage is that the philosophical-sounding remarks in theb ook arew rongly read as assertions,a sp ropositions in the senseo ft rue-or-false pictures as opposedt ot autologous thoughts that show something about languagea nd thew orld. Though Wittgensteinc annot be said to have workedw ith as ingle, precise notion of nonsense, he usually reserves the charge of nonsensicalityfor fraudulent statements, and in 6.54 he is -on the interpretationIf avour -saying thath is remarks aref raudulentw hen takena sc ontributingp ositively to what is known about language,t he world or anything else. His contention is that, understood as statements,h is Sätze are nonsensical,i.e. cannot be said or,whatamountstothe samething, cannotb es ignificantly communicated (compare Black 1964: 379) . He proceedst ruet of orma nd would have us noticet hath ei sn ot contributing to natural science (or metaphysics). However the thoughts of the book may initiallya ppear, when construed as genuinepropositions,they are nothingbut waffle.
To avoid ap ossible misunderstanding, Is hould emphasiset hat Ia mn ot interpretingt he remarks/thoughts/propositions of the Tractatus as "combinations of symbols that havet he appearance of saying something whilet heya re in fact 'nonsensical'" (Medina 2002:9) . It is no part of my argumentthat Wittgenstein's sentences are "pseudopropositions" in the senseo f" symbolic creatures that have ad eceitful nature" (ibid.). As Is ee it, it is am istake to think that "[w]e learn atthe end of thebook that all 'propositions' of the Tractatus are deceitful in thisw ay: theyh ave ap ropositional appearance buta re in fact unsinnig (6.54)" (ibid.). Ia ms uggesting that Wittgenstein's remarksa re pseudopropositions only in the sense that logical propositions, mathematical equations and the axioms of mechanicsa re, and their naturei sd eceitfulo nly in the senset hat they have thea ppearanceo fs tating non-trivial truths. Theya re not to be regarded as unsinnig without addition or qualification since they also have at rue, nondeceitful nature,e ach beingc omprehensible as at autology.N or do Ia gree that since "tautologies ...a re not deceitful", " [t] hep ropositions of the Tractatus arecertainly nottautological" (Medina 2002: 9, 10) .
Central to how Ir ead6 .54, then,i st he point that Wittgenstein meanst oa lert ther eader to the fact that the tautologoust houghts expressed in thebodyofthe work are unassertible. He is not saying hisu nassailably andd efinitively true thoughts arei nt he final analysisn onsensical or presuming the possibility of nonsense expressingtruth.Heisnoting -albeit not in so manywords -that anya ttempt to assert the remarkso ft he book,n ol ess than tautologies narrowly understood, results in "'non-sensical' formations of words" (Anscombe 1959: 163) . This is integral to hist hinking. He takes sentences with content to be assertibleand holdsthat it is nonsensical to assert sentencest hat say nothing. In his view propositions in thes ense specified in the Tractatus are assertible as wella se xpressible, tautologies merely expressible. He is able to have it both ways since he takest autologies to show, propositions to say,a nd thinkst he core remarkso ft he books how without saying. There is no contradiction between the Preface and6.54, the expression of an unassailably and definitively true thought being altogetherd ifferent from a( meaningful) true-or-false proposition.
For Wittgenstein unasserted tautologies express true thoughts while asserted ones express nothing whatsoever.
Sinnlos and unsinnig
At thisj uncturei tm ay be objected thatIam overlooking that Wittgensteint akes everyt autologousr emark to collapse into nothingness,tobe"aperfect andabsoluteblank" (Anscombe1959: 76-77, Black1 964:2 35). Thisi sn ot an unreasonable criticism if only because at 4.466 Wittgensteine xplicitly speaks of the "dissolution [Auflösung]" of tautologies( TLP 1961 renders "Auflösung" as "disintegration"). (Alsosee AM:118: "Whathappens in [a 'tautology (not alogicalproposition)']isthat allits simple parts have meaning, but it is such that thec onnexions between these paralyseordestroyo ne another,sothatthey are connectedinonly some irrelevant manner.")S till the objectioni sn ot unanswerable. Leaving aside the fact thatt he metaphor of dissolutioni smeant to getu so ver the hump that truth, as Wittgenstein characterises it, attaches exclusively to pictures, there is the difficulty thath ei s equallywell,ifnot better, read as takingtautologiestocollapse into (trivial) truth. To borrow ap hrasef romalater work, each of the sentencesofthe Tractatus is mostnaturally regarded, like "If p, then p",as"adegenerateproposition, whichisonthe sideoftruth", "an important pointo fi ntersection of significant sentences" (RFM III, §33).
Nori si tf atal to what Ia ma rguing that in 6.54W ittgenstein declaresh is propositions to be nonsensical (unsinnig), nots enseless (sinnlos). It is tempting to think that consistency alones houldh ave preventedhim fromtaking his remarks as tautologies giventhat he writes: "Tautology andcontradiction arewithout sense[sind sinnlos]. ... Tautology andc ontradiction are, however,n ot nonsensical [sind abernichtunsinnig]" (4.461-4.4611). Hadhemeanthis thoughts to be read as sinnlos whenunasserted (andasunsinnig only when asserted), would he not haves aid so? In response,Iw ould reiteratet hat Wittgensteinspeaks of the truth of histhoughts as unassailable and definitive andn otet hat, as someoned isinclinedt od evelop his ideas, he may havepreferredtoleave it unmentioned that he means "nonsensical if asserted".B ut Iw ould also underscore that he is not entirelyconsistentinhis useof"sinnlos" and "unsinnig".Thus at 5.1362 he writes: "'Aknowsthat p is thecase' is senseless [sinnlos] if pis at autology",a nd at 5.5351 he refers to "sinnlose Hypothese",i n fact switches between "unsinnig" and "sinnlos".M oret ot he point therei st he awkward fact thatw hile he criticised the Ogden/Ramseyt ranslation on numerous points, some quite small, he was apparently unperturbedb y" unsinnig" being rendereda s " senseless" at 4.124a nd 5.473, indeed even letst he translation of "am Ende als unsinnig" as "finally ... as senseless" in 6.54p ass withoutcomment (CCO: 19-37).
The lasto fm yq uestions about 6.54, theo ne about the nature of the ladder and what is seen oncei ti sc limbed, now practically answers itself. Far from coming to appreciatet hat Wittgenstein's remarks (incidental comments aside)a re nonsensical and philosophy acharade,weare meant -on thepresent interpretation -to notice something about thel adder we haveb een climbing, specifically thati ts steps do not have the character they appear to have. At the top of the ladder,wedonot have to discard the means that putu si nto ap ositiont os ee "the world aright",o nlyh avet o abandon the easyassumption that propositions have beena sserted as well as thoughts expressed. Wittgenstein's clarifications are not lost, just the impression that theystatehow things are, andthere is no needt oe xplain how al adderl acking secure steps can be climbed or how we can have fooled ourselves into thinkingw e haveb een climbingaladder without steps. Both thel addera nd its steps remain in place, andW ittgenstein canbereada sbelieving he has providedawayt o" surmount [überwinden]" his "propositions", "to climb up beyondt hem".T he message of his parting shot -"Whereof one cannots peak, thereof one must remain silent" (7) -is not that there aren o( unassertible)e xpressible thoughts, only thatthere are no (assertible)philosophical propositions.
Onen otable reason thatW ittgenstein is persistently misread,I am inclined to think,isthat nonsensical utterance is taken to be the only alternative to assertion( e.g. Conant and Dain 2011: § 1).I ti s insufficientlyappreciatedthat treating6.54seriouslydoes not force us to supposeW ittgenstein is peddling gibberish disguised as truth or purportingt oc onvey information in nonsensicalr emarks. He does not have to be read as packaging truth in thef orm of nonsense or repudiating philosophy outo fh and,i tb eingp ossible to regardh im,a sIhave been arguing,a se xpressing thoughts that say, state,d escribe, representn othing.Y et again his remarks about science clarifythe situation. He is able to slip betweenthe Scylla of accepting thei deao fi mportant nonsense andt he Charybdis of treating his Sätze as out-and-out nonsensicalb ecause he believes that in thec aseo fh is own thoughts, as in the caseo fN ewtonian Mechanics, "the fact that [the world] can be described by [them] asserts nothing about the world; but this asserts something,namely, that it can be describedi nt hat particular wayi nw hicha samatter of facti ti sd escribed" (6.342). In particular when oner eflects on his observationt hat "[t]hrough theirw hole logical apparatus the physical laws stills peak of the objects of the world" (6.3431), one cana ccept that " [t] here is indeed thei nexpressible [Unaussprechliches]",which "showsitself" (6.522).
When the Tractatus is interpreted as comprisingt autologies comparable to logicalt ruths, mathematicale quations andt he axioms of mechanics( and is taken to shows omethingt hatc annot be asserted in thef ormo fp ropositions), terms of criticism commoni nt he secondaryl iterature devoted to the Tractatus prove to hinder moret hant heyh elp.I ti sp ointless to debate whether Wittgenstein's remarks aret heoretical or therapeutic, his aim being to clarify thee ssentialn ature of representationw ith an eye to showing that "ther easonw hy [the problemso fp hilosophy]a re posed is thatt he logic of ourl anguage is misunderstood" (TLP 1955: 27/TLP1 961: 3; also compare4 .003) . Andi ti sl ikewise unnecessary to ask whetherW ittgensteins hould be interpreted as "resolute" or "irresolute".H ec an be reada sp roceedingr esolutely in that his sentences arem eant without exception to express unassailably and definitelyt rue thoughts thatr educe to nonsense when asserted.A nd he can be read as proceeding irresolutelyi n thath ec onceives thoughts andp ropositions differently in the Preface and at 6.54 from how he officially conceives them.Itisnot thatthe theory/therapy and resolute/irresolute distinctions have no use, justt hat theyh ave to be handled with care and do not map straightforwardlyone on to the other.
Nothing Ihavesaid entails thatthe Tractatus is lesssophisticated or moreelusive thanusually supposed. My point is that thealready difficult task of fathoming what Wittgenstein is driving at is made more difficultw hen his description of his own remarks in the Preface is takent ob ei ns erious conflictw ithh is description of themat6.54. When he is read as speakinghis mind in both sets of remarksa nd as referring to his thoughtsd ifferently fromh ow he refers to hisp ropositions, thes ubtlety of hisp hilosophy shines through and what he is driving at is more readilya ppreciated.H is discussion is highlym odulated ands yncopated,a nd allowing that he expresses true thoughts,wesaveourselves the unrewarding task of explaining awaymuch of whathesays -andwhat he saysabout what he says. There is no substitute fortracing Wittgenstein's steps anda ttemptingt of igureo ut what he says remark by remark and why he might havet aken himselft ob ee xpressing unassertible thoughts. More common ways of interpreting the text may render it mored igestibleb ut only at the price of simplifyingh is message and opening him to harsh criticism. 
